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I.
REPLY ARGUMENT
The nature of the responses made by Respondent, Renee Baird, and Intervenor
Bankruptcy Trustee, Jeremy Gugino, are similar enough in substance and content that Appellant
Sallaz will reply to both briefs in a single joint Reply brief. Unless the argument made in this
reply is specifically directed to a response of one or the other of those responding parties, this
reply argument should be considered as directed to arguments that have been made by both of
those responding parties.

A.

"Consent"And "Estoppel" Are No Defense To Lack Of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Since the 2004 decision in Dire v. Dire-Blodgett, 140 Idaho 777, 102 P.3d 1096 (2004), it

has been made clear Idaho's Legislative change in Idaho's public policy, effective January 1,
1996, eliminated any future recognition of common law marriage in this state, and that any
marriage entered into in this state, after that date, to be valid, requires a marriage license. The
attempted marriage at issue in this appeal is purported to have arisen under Oregon law on July
4, 1996. If valid under Oregon law, then Idaho will recognize that marriage as valid under I.C. §
32-209. Oregon law requires a license for a valid marriage to exist under that state's statutes.
Preure v. Benhadj-Djillali, 15 So.3d 877 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2009) (applying Oregon law).
Both of the responding parties have continued to argue in this appeal, that Appellant
Dennis Sallaz has either omitted facts, or has been evasive, by his failure to acknowledge that in
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the proceedings below he "admitted" the existence of the marriage by his answer to the
complaint, and by sworn testimony he offered in proceedings before the magistrate court and in
depositions. The Record below is certainly clear, and no one -least of all Dennis Sallaz - is
attempting to hide from that Record. The point has been made repeatedly in Appellant's
Opening brief that, in the context of the subject matter jurisdiction, as it is raised here, these
alleged "admissions" are simply irrelevant to the determination of that question in this appeal.
The parties, by agreement or otherwise, can never confer subject matter jurisdiction upon
the court. City afEagle v. IDWR, 150 Idaho 449, 454, 247 P.3d 1037,1042 (2011), citing ta,

State v. Urrabaza, 150 Idaho 158, 162-63,244 P.3d 1244, 148-49 (2010). The public policy
implications that arise from the arguments that have been made by the responding parties in this
appeal is to the effect that both the Idaho Legislature's public policy determination that common
law marriages will not be entered into in this state after July 1, 1996, and the requirement
solemnized marriages must be represented by a license, can simply be evaded by a judicial
admission, perhaps even one that had been entered into by collusion. See, Griff, Inc. v. Curry

Bean Ca., Inc., 138 Idaho 315, 321, 63 P.3d 441, 447 (2003) (declaring the effect of a judicial
admission).
On the other hand, Appellant Sallaz has argued that in the absence of the existence of an
actual "marital res", there is no subject matter jurisdiction in the court to decree a divorce of a
non-existent marriage, or to divide any community property - because there is no community
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estate from which there is an property to divide. This is a non-waivable jurisdictional issue. It
cannot be avoided, and just as importantly, it is one that can be raised at any time.
The responding parties in this appeal, particularly to be directed to Respondent Renee
Baird, have argued that at some point in time jurisdictional challenges should be cut off.
(Respondent's re-statement of the second issue presented on appeal at pg. 7; argument presented
at pp. 12-14). In reply to that argument, Appellant Sallaz would point to the Idaho Supreme
Court's decision in State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837,252 P.3d 1255 (2011), as decided on subject
matter jurisdictional grounds, in which a criminal conviction was reversed nine years after
Appellant Lute's entire sentence had been completed, on the basis the grandjury that had
indicted him had done so after the expiration of its term, such that there was no indictment at all!
150 Idaho at 841, 252 P .3d at 1259. 1 Certainly, the decision in Lute rebuts the responding
parties' argument that at some point in time jurisdictional issues must simply be "cut-off."

B.

A Court Has "Sufficient Jurisdiction" To Determine If A Marriage Exists Before It
Can Then Exercise Divorce Jurisdiction
Both the district court below, (R., pp. 350-353), and the Trustee-Intervenor in this appeal,

(Intervenor's Brief on Appeal at pp. 8-9), have asserted a position to Appellant's challenge over
the magistrate's lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the divorce proceedings below, to the effect
that the magistrate court had "sufficient jurisdiction" to determine the threshold question

The Idaho Court of Appeals in, State v. Wolfe, 2013 WL 6014054 (November 14,
2013) applied res judicata to bar Wolfe's subject matter jurisdiction argument, as based upon
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whether it had subject matter jurisdiction. At no time during these judicial proceedings has
Appellant Sallaz ever argued that any court lacked "jurisdiction" to determine its own "subject
matter" jurisdiction. In the opening brief, Appellant Sallaz specifically cited the rule that a court
has "sua sponte" authority to raise and ensure its own subject matter jurisdiction. In re City of

Shelley, 151 Idaho 289,294,255 P.3d 1175, 1180 (2011). More to the point, it is this very Idaho
appellate authority, on this very question of law, that neither the district court below, nor the
responding parties in this appeal, have either raised, distinguished or even cited?
In 1980, the Idaho Supreme Court, in Freiburghaus v. Freiburghaus, 100 Idaho 730, 604
P.2d 1209 (1980) reversed the issuance of a writ of prohibition in a divorce proceeding that
concerned the existence of a common law marriage. The entire holding of the Court on this issue
was as follows:
The Court having jurisdiction over the matter had the power to make the
alimony and attorney fee awards. I.C. § 32-704 states:
"While an action for divorce is pending, the court may, in its
discretion, require the husband to pay as alimony any money
necessary to enable wife to support herself or her children or to
prosecute or defend the action."
While it might be, as argued by counsel for the respondent and found by
the district court in issuing the writ of prohibition, that the magistrate erred in
finding that a marriage existed, any such error would be one in the exercise of
jurisdiction, but not in excess of jurisdiction. Gasper v. District Court, supra.

State v. Lute. The Idaho Supreme Court has granted review. Case No. 41705-2014.
2
To the extent Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3(a)(2) applies, the Appellant
Sallaz invokes that rule on this argument. See, 2013 Idaho Court Rules Vol. 2, pg. 598.
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Having held that the magistrate did not act in excess of his jurisdiction it is
unnecessary to consider whether there was a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
at law.
100 Idaho at 732,604 P.2d at 1211.
After remand, the case was again appealed, and was assigned to the Court of Appeals.
This time, in Freiburghaus v. Freiburghaus, 103 Idaho 679, 651 P.2d 944 (Ct.App.1982), that
Court found that no common law marriage ever existed, on the basis that the parties had never
held themselves out publicly as being married, an essential element of common law marriages, as
it was then-recognized in the state ofIdaho. Due the absence of a valid marriage, the Court of
Appeals reversed the decree of divorce.
Although the Idaho Supreme Court directly addressed, and upheld, the exercise of subject
matter jurisdiction of the magistrate in respect to the support issues in the first Freiburghaus
decision, that holding was essentially procedural, as arising out ofLC. § 32-704. Ultimately, the
determination made by the Court of Appeals in the second Freiburghaus decision is consistent
with the argument Appellant Sallaz has presented to this Court, and as was later reached by the
Supreme Court in Dire v. Dire-Blodgett. In the absence of a valid marriage, a court lacks the
required subject matter jurisdiction over a "marriage res" necessary to grant a divorce, or to
divide community property.
C.

Responding Parties Have Pointed To No Evidence Establishing A Valid Oregon
Marriage
This appeal could have been brought to a rapid conclusion if either of the responding
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parties established the existence of a valid Oregon marriage between Renee Baird and Dennis
Sallaz. Neither Oregon, (since 1925 - Hurad v. McTeigh, 113 Or. 279, 295, 232 P. 658,663 (Or.
1925», nor Idaho, (since January 1, 1996 - I.C. § 32-301), recognize newly formed common law
marriages at the time Sallaz-Baird attempted to marry in July, 1996. Both states require a
marriage license before a valid marriage will arise. Dire v. Dire-Blodgett, 140 Idaho 777, 102
P.3d 1096 (2004), and Preure v. Benhadj-Djillali, 15 So.3d 877 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2009)
(applying Oregon law).
After this appeal was filed, on November 13,2013 the Appellant Sallaz filed a motion
challenging the standing of the Intervenor-Respondent, as being a real party in interest in this
appeal, on the basis that the only issue raised in this appeal was that of subject matter jurisdiction
based upon the absence of a valid and enforceable marriage between Dennis Sallaz and Renee
Baird. Between the date that motion was filed, and the filing of the two Response Briefs in this
appeal on February 18 and 19,2014,97 days passed in which any record substantiating the
Oregon marriage could have been produced by those responding parties. No record, not even
any declaration concerning a marriage license, has been provided by those responding parties in
their briefing or motions to this Court. Not even any statement that a marriage license was taken
out, but then not filed, or that it was filed late, or that it was lost or misplaced. Simply no
explanation is proffered -nothing. This certainly should suggest that a verifying Oregon
marriage license, concerning the alleged Sallaz-Baird marriage, does not - and never did - exist.
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An appellate court can take judicial notice on the same basis as any other court of this
state. Trautman v. Hill, 116 Idaho 337, 340, 775 P.2d 651,654 (Ct.App.1989), cited
authoritatively in Crawford v. Dept. of Correction, 133 Idaho 633, 636 n. 1,991 P.2d 358, 361 n.
1. (1999). 3 Idaho's ability to recognize an Oregon marriage between Dennis and Renee under
I.C. § 32-209 is dependent upon the existence of a valid Oregon marriage. No record of such an
Oregon marriage license - in any form - exists, let alone in this case. The only indication in the
record in this appeal is that response from state of Oregon, confirming no such Oregon marriage
license exists in the public records ofthat state (R., pp. 281-282). The responding parties on this
appeal have not directly objected to that evidence below, nor did they move to strike it from the
record in this appeal, as they know Oregon's response to be fact.
Without the ability to recognize a common law marriage after January 1, 1996, current
Idaho law can only recognize an out-of-state marriage that is valid where contracted. In Oregon,
as in Idaho, this means there must be positive proof by means of a marriage license. Because
there is no evidence of the existence of an Oregon marriage license in this case, there can be no
valid Oregon marriage between Dennis and Renee for the magistrate to create a basis from which
to recognize such a marriage in Idaho under I.C. § 32-209. Consequently they had no marriage
that could have been dissolved in an Idaho divorce proceeding, much less any Idaho community

3

Judicial notice is taken of adjudicative facts not subject to reasonable dispute and
capable of accurate and ready determination. In Martin v. Camas County, 150 Idaho 508, 512,
248 P.3d 1243, 1247 (2011) an, "adjudicative fact" was defined as "[a] controlling or operative
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property that could have arisen and divided in that divorce proceeding. Likewise, community
property only exists, if the parties have entered into a valid marriage. I.C. § 32-903 ("All
property ... owned ... before marriage ... shall remain his or her sole and separate property")
and I.C. § 32-906 ("All other property acquired after marriage ... is community property")
(emphasis added).

D.

"Marriage Res" Is Fundamental To Subiect Matter Jurisdiction In All Divorce
Proceedings
The parties to this appeal are sharply divided on the significance of the question

concerning the absence of an actual license or certificate of marriage between Dennis and Renee
in respect to the ability of a court to grant a divorce, then determine and then divide the parties'
property. Appellant Sallaz considers the issue to be one of subject matter jurisdiction, as the
absence of a "marital res" prevents a court from either granting a divorce or dividing nonexistent community property. Because the question necessarily goes to the court's subject matter
jurisdiction, the parties therefore cannot, merely by their consent, confer that jurisdiction upon
the court, nor can that issue be barred by either doctrine of estoppel or waiver. City of Eagle v.

Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 150 Idaho 449, 454, 247 P.3d 1037, 1042 (2011) ("Estoppel is
not appropriate where jurisdiction is at issue.").
The responding parties have argued the question presented is not one of subject matter
jurisdiction, but that instead it is only a matter of justicability, which when considered within the

fact, rather than a background fact; .... "
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doctrine of mootness, results in a court simply declining to exercise its jurisdiction. Respondents
would argue that in any event, by the consent of the parties, as provided in the pleadings, it can
simply eliminate any issue concerning the existence of a valid marriage. See, TrusteeIntervenor's Brief at pp. 8-9; See, Respondent's Brief at pp. 8-14.
So with that clear distinction, the table is set for this Court to now decide in this appeal
whether a valid "marital res" does, as a matter of law, constitutes a fundamental and critical
condition precedent to the existence and exercise of an Idaho court's subject matter jurisdiction
in an action for divorce, or whether, in the alternative, any jurisdictional prerequisite that may be
required in a divorce action can be met and satisfied by the simple expediency of a well-drafted
divorce complaint, met by specific admissions forthcoming from the answer to that complaint.
Let's take the example of a man and a woman, within the state of Idaho in 1997,
undertake to merely exchanged "marriage" vows in front of their friends, thereafter cohabited as
"husband and wife," for the next 17 years, and during that time bought property, produced four
biological children, filed joint tax returns, accumulated and held a good deal of ''jointly-owned''
property, and generally held themselves out as "married", what should prevent them from
obtaining a divorce on the same basis as any other married person can in 2014?
,..

Should one party be able to file a divorce complaint, to which the other party then
"admits," which then creates through that "admission" the very same "marriage"
as if they had observed the formalities otherwise legislatively required under
Idaho law at the time they entered into the relationship?

,..

Does it matter that the effect of such a divorce complaint would serve to validate
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common law marriage, which has been abolished by the Idaho Legislature?
Does it matter that the effect of such a divorce complaint would serve to validate
a marriage undertaken without required formalities ofIdaho law (I.C. § 32-301),
particularly a marriage license?
Does it matter that the effect of such a divorce complaint would allow for the
division of "community property," which has been reserved to only those
individuals recognized as "married" (I.C. § 32-903 & 906) under Idaho law?
Does it matter that the effect of such a divorce complaint would largely, through
judicial recognition or judicial estoppel, usurp public policy functions that are
exclusively reserved to the Idaho Legislature?
If the existence of a valid marriage is reduced to nothing more than a mere "pleading
requirement" created at the time of divorce, then the parties to a divorce action - perhaps acting
collusively - need only plead and "admit' the existence of a valid marriage, and ignore the law.
If the responding parties to this appeal are held to be correct in their analysis of Idaho law, then
no jurisdictional bar exists to prevent persons who have not contracted a marriage recognized
under Idaho law from invoking the "jurisdiction" of a divorce court, and obtaining the benefits of
a court-ordered divorce, including the division of "community property."
On the other hand, if Appellant Sallaz is correct in his analysis of Idaho law, then the
parties who have not contracted to create a valid marriage recognized under Idaho law can
"never", by their mere consent or "admissions", confer subject matter jurisdiction upon a court to
grant them a divorce or divide non-existent community property, nor can those persons ever be
"estopped" from raising that jurisdictional defect.
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E.

Rule 52, 59, And 60 Motions Are Not Conditions Precedent To Challenge A Court's
Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction On Appeal
The Bankruptcy Trustee, as the Intervenor-Respondent in this appeal, has argued this

appeal is nothing more than an attempt by Appellant Sallaz to "solve his irreparable mistake of
failing to comply with the relevant Civil Rules." Intervenor's Brief on Appeal at pg. 11. No
authority is cited by the Trustee to support this argument. In fact, there is no requirement a
timely motion filed under Rules 52, 59, or 60 is a condition precedent to a timely appeal.
Instead, there is a substantial body of Idaho case law to the contrary proposition that a Rule 60(b)
motion should not be used as a substitute for a timely appeal. See e.g., Maynard v. Nguyen, 152
Idaho 724, 727, 274 P.3d 589, 591 (2011).
Within the Civil Rules, the controlling provision appears to be Rule 12(g)(4), which
declares as follows:
Rule 12(g). Waiver or preservation of certain defenses.

(4) Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the
court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.
(Emphasis added). This rule, that the question of subject matter jurisdiction is always a first
priority, and is consistent with the general rule that a defect in subject matter jurisdiction can be
raised at any time, including for the first time on appeal. State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 832,264
P.3d 935,939 (2011).
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It is quite likely that the 14-day time limit in which to bring timely motions under either

Rule 52 or 59 had passed by the time the facts underlying the jurisdictional question raised in
this appeal had even emerged following entry of the January 4,2012 Judgment, making any
motions under those rules impossible. As the case law so consistently has held, any judgment
that has been entered without subject matter jurisdiction is void. Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho
283,291,221 P.3d 81,89 (2009). Consequently, any attempt to set aside a judgment under Rule
60(b) could also have been made under Rule 60(b)(4). Rule 60(b) also declares that:
This rules does not limit the power of a court to: (i) entertain an independent
action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding, ...
Once alerted to the fact that Renee Baird had effectively enticed Dennis Sallaz to enter
into a "non- marriage" from the initiation of the "Portland ceremonial wedding", it took the
passage of time before the truth surfaced, and then the need to investigate the Oregon record to
determine whether those allegations "they were never married" was true. The actual Oregon
record absolutely confirmed the undisputed evidence as to the absence of any marriage license
for these parties, and is dated August 13,2012. (R., pg. 281). The issue itself was raised earlier,
and preserved, as asserted to the court by the February 9, 2012 Notice of Appeal to the District
Court. (R., pg. 194).
Consequently, Dennis Sallaz thought it just as appropriate to also pursue the independent
action route, by which a full factual record on the question could then be developed, and against
which the Respondent Baird and the Intervenor Trustee vigorously opposed, causing it to be
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dismissed, essentially upon the idea there was an adequate remedy available by virtue of the
pending appeal. See, Sallaz v. Baird-Sallaz, Fourth Dist., Ada County Case No. CV-OC 201217666, filed on 9/2812012, and dismissed on 12114/12, (R., pp. 339-340).

F.

Neither Baird Nor Trustee-Intervenor Are Entitled To Award Of Attorney's Fees
As a party, proceeding pro se on this appeal, Respondent Renee Baird is not entitled to an

award of attorney's fees, even if she could somehow prevail in this appeal. Capstar Radio

Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 153 Idaho 411, 425, 283 P.3d 728, 742 (2012); and Cobbley v. City
o/Challis, 138 Idaho 154, 160,59 P.3d 959,965 (2002). Nor has she cited any authority to
support her argument that she should be allowed to make a surrogate request for an award of
attorney's fees on behalf of the bankruptcy trustee, as the Intervenor Respondent in this appeal.
As to the request for Attorney's fees made by Intervenor Respondent, the trustee has
done nothing more than make a bare request for an award of attorney's fees under I.C. § 12-121,
without providing any citation of authority to support that request, and without providing any
substantive argument to support any basis for that request, recognizing this to be a substantial
issue and question of jurisdictional law, the cornerstone of a court's foundation for authority. A
request for attorney fees must be supported by both argument and authority. See Poole v. Davis,
153 Idaho 604, 288 P.3d 821 (2012), In that holding, the Idaho Supreme Court declared that,
"Further, this Court has held that a party requesting attorney fees on appeal must provide, in its
initial brief, 'authority and argument establishing a right to fees,' and that merely citing 'statutes
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and rules authorizing fees, without more, is insufficient.' Carroll v. MBNA Am. Bank, 148 Idaho
261,270,220 PJd 1080, 1089 (2009)." 153 Idaho at 609, 288 P.3d at 826 (emphasis added).
A prevailing party on appeal may be awarded attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121 only
when the Court is left with the abiding belief that the appeal was brought, pursued, or defended
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.
Sixty-nine days before filing Appellant's Opening Brief in this appeal, Appellant Sallaz
filed his motion to fundamentally challenge the standing of the Bankruptcy Trustee to participate
in this appeal. In that motion he declared the only issue to be raised in the appeal was the
question of the magistrate court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction to proceed in the divorce
action, given the absence of a valid underlying marriage. Ever since that question first emerged,
shortly after entry of the January 4,2012 judgment on the community property issues, and then
followed by Renee Baird's voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, the responding parties in
this appeal have vigorously opposed every attempt by Appellant Sallaz to determine the "factual
record" in respect to the parties' purported "Oregon marriage". Ironically, and as clearly allowed
by the appellate rules, neither responding party ever objected to, let alone moved to strike, either on the district court appeal, or in this appeal - the Sallaz affidavit that identified the event
of his first awareness, or the Oregon record that has declared there is no public record of any
alleged Sallaz-Baird marriage.
Instead, both responding parties in this appeal have followed the tact of simply ignoring
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and avoiding the essential issue of subject matter jurisdiction, the fundamental question raised by
Appellant Sallaz in this appeal, and rather than grappling with that critical issue, or even
responding to the important public policy questions that were presented as a result of that
jurisdictional issue, they instead attach themselves to such ideas as waiver, admission, consent,
estoppel, and untimeliness. Regardless of how this Court should view its precedence to resolve
this jurisdictional question in this appeal, the record on appeal supports a determination the
question has been raised, preserved, and presented by this appeal, and has neither been brought
nor pursued frivolously or unreasonably by Appellant Sallaz, as it presents a foundational
question oflaw, fundamental to the authority of a court to take action in divorce cases, and the
very statutory enactments that created Idaho's "valid marriage" laws are now on the line.
Therefore, both Respondent Baird and the Intervenor Respondent's request for attorney's
fees under I.C. § 12-121 should be denied.
II.
CONCLUSION
As requested in Appellant's Opening Brief, on the basis that the magistrate court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction because Dennis Sallaz and Renee Baird never entered into a valid
Oregon marriage, this Court on appeal is requested to vacate the January 4, 2012 community
property jUdgment, and fundamental thereto, to vacate and set aside the underlying July 28, 2005
divorce decree, upon which that community property judgment was based and derived, as it was
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void and of no effect from the date of entry thereof.

Respectfully Submitted this 23 rd day of March, 2014.

Vernon K. Smith
Attorney for Appellant
Dennis J. Sallaz
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